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Abstract
Purpose – In recent years, an increasing interest in the participative practices of the workpeople in
their companies has taken place in the European Union. Taking advantage of this situation, the
purpose of this paper is to show additional evidence of the benefits from companies with majority
worker’s capital participation as opposed to firms that do not follow this approach. Bearing in mind,
also, that Spain is the only European country with the juridical form of financial majority participation
of the workpeople, in order to recommend it in the European context according to the reached results.
Design/methodology/approach – To study whether or not there are differences in the two types of
companies, a logistic regression model is used.
Findings – In this study, results indicate that business profitability (return on assets), productivity and
equity capital coefficient are not significant variables for the purpose of determining the distinguishing
features of labour-owned firm (LOF) as against capitalist firm. The only variable of those originally
included which has turned out to be significant is the financial profitability (return on equity).
Practical implications – Initial proposal: specific European law governing investment capital of
employees.
Originality/value – The study will be useful to show the characteristics of Spanish LOFs (operating
under their own legal structure) and their benefits.
Keywords Return on capital employed, Spain, Business enterprise, Business analysis, Employees
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Access of employees to ownership of the companies inwhich theywork has been promoted
for some years now in the European Union. This is a result of many studies (European
Commission, 2002), which show that financial participation of employees in its various
forms, such as: profit sharing, shareholding, stock options and/or asset accumulation and
saving plans, boosts employees’ motivation, raises productivity and improves
competitiveness andprofitability, aswell as being avaluable instrument for raising capital.
The benefits of integrating capital and labour in the company as outlined by
Morales et al. (2003, p. 20) had already been described in the nineteenth century by Mill
(1879) and Jevons (1887), who concluded that employees who were also owners of their
company worked harder for it and were more concerned about the quality of
production because they had a more positive perception of their work, a greater sense
of duty and a wish to increase their earnings, which depend on the business.
However, in order to achieve better results, employees need to be involved in areas
other than the merely financial, something which can be achieved by means of
participative management techniques. In other words, employees’ ownership of
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companies produces more positive effects on business results when combined with
other measures which provide an environment in which employees can use tools,
training and opportunities to play an active role in decision making (Lejarriaga Perez
de Las Vacas, 2002; Vanek, 1970).
The aim of this paper is to study whether performance differences between
labour-owned firm (LOF) and capitalist firm (CF) firms are due primarily to
dissimilarities in capital ownership structures inherent in both types of enterprises. For
these purposes, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the European and
Spanish legal framework of this context and the companies studied. In Section 3, the
theoretical background, methodology and statistical data are presented, and the final
two sections contain results and conclusions.
2. Legal framework
2.1 European legal framework
Employee participation in companies has been established as a key objective of
European policy, as stated in different reports, recommendations and resolutions on
the subject, given that the European Union (European Commission, 2002) considers
financial participation of employees in companies to be one of the bases on which to
build the European social model based on cooperation, with the aim of overcoming the
existing dichotomy between capital and labour.
The European legal framework regarding financial participation can be divided into
two long stages.
The first starts with the oldest reference that can be found in the Action Programme
of the European Commission (1989) for the application of the Community Charter of
Fundamental Social Rights of 5 December 1989, which outlines the creation of an
instrument for shareholding and financial participation of employees.
As part of the preparation of this instrument, the European Commission (1991)
launched a project which would evolve into the first PEPPER Report on promoting
employee participation in profits and business results, which reviewed the situation
regarding financial participation in Europe at that time.
As a result, the Council of Europe Recommendation of 27 July 1992 on the
promotion of employee participation in profits and business results (including
participation in its capital) invited member states to recognise the benefits of more
widespread use of financial participation (European Commission, 1992).
The second PEPPER Report (European Commission, 1998), into the application of
the above-mentioned recommendation, highlighted the beneficial effects of financial
participation systems in terms of the increased productivity, profitability and
competitiveness linked to their implementation.
The first stage ends with the European Parliament Resolution on the 1998 report.
According to Terradillos Ormaetxea (2004), had this issue been regulated by a
directive, the binding force of this would have established a legal base for the effective
promotion of participation in shareholding by employees, through state legislation or
collective negotiation.
The second stage opens with the renewed interest of the commission in the
promotion of different methods of financial participation of employees in their firms,
convinced that its benefits for all concerned can contribute to the attainment of the
employment objectives set at the Lisbon Summit in 2001.
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This second stage starts with the commission communication to the council, the
Parliament, the Social and Economic Committee and the Regional Committee “about a
framework for the financial participation of employees” (European Commission, 2002),
which reflects this renewed interest in employee participation schemes. Their
development is potentially facilitated by the definition of a series of general principles
and the promotion of concrete actions to overcome transnational obstacles impeding or
limiting the introduction of PEPPER systems.
Finally, the recent incorporation of eastern European countries into the European
Union was behind the third PEPPER Report of June 2006, which covers the
situation regarding participation schemes in those countries (European Commission,
2006).
2.2 Spanish legal framework
Of the different forms of participation mentioned above, we have chosen to focus on the
participation of employees in the firm’s capital, with the aim of “contributing
additional evidence regarding the relative significance and importance of the benefits
claimed for this form of participation.” At the same time, given that Spanish law
provides for companies with majority financial participation by employees, we
recommend this in the European context, based on the results obtained.
For this purpose, the following section briefly refers to the legal framework for the
companies which will be studied here: LOFs and CFs.
2.2.1 Labour-owned firms. LOFs operate in Spain under their own legal structure,
defined in Law 4 of March 1997, which has yet to be matched in any other European
country (Lejarriaga Perez de Las Vacas, 2002). According to this legislation, the LOFs
primary characteristic is that employees with full time, open-ended contracts with the
firm must own at least 50 per cent of the LOF’s capital.
Furthermore, limits are set on the number of non-partner employees on open-ended
contracts with the aim of allowing them to participate if the firm grows and generates
employment. With a minimum of three partners required to set-up such a company, the
distribution of capital per partner is also regulated in such a way that no partner can
individually own more than a third of the company’s capital.
In return, in recognition of their social as well as economic purpose, LOFs enjoy
fiscal advantages in the shape of tax breaks and exemptions.
2.2.2 Capitalist firms. CFs are those firms in which access to the status of partner is
granted by the capital, thus becoming a means and an end in itself. Financial
partnership in this type of company does not imply participation in other business
processes.
The Spanish legal framework allows for different types of CF, such as the public
limited and limited liability company. For the purposes of a more homogeneous study,
we have chosen to focus here on the second.
Further, the limited liability company is a widely used legal formula, accounting for
25 per cent of the productive fabric of the Spanish economy as opposed to the 5 per cent
represented by public companies.
The reasons for this can be found in the formulation of the law itself. Law 2/1995, 23
March 1995, governing limited liability companies allows greater flexibility for these
than for public companies. The smaller sum of capital involved, the lower start-up
costs, the unlimited number of partners and the ability to be personalised yet at the
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same time a capital company are among the features of a limited liability company
which make it the most appropriate legal formula for the business organisation of
employees and as a vehicle for participation in the company.
3. Theoretical framework
Recent years have seen growing interest in the participative practices of employees in
their companies, although it has to be said that this is at a very different across
member states of the European Union. While some countries have a long tradition of
employee participation, in others it is applied only on a small scale.
At the same time, the benefits linked to systems of financial participation by
employees has been emphasised in a growing number of studies, which have provided
rich empirical evidence (Cooke, 1994; Fernie and Metcalf, 1995; Batt and Appelbaum,
1995; Aghion and Tirole, 1997).
The most recent studies have shown that a greater impact on productivity and
business results can be achieved if financial participation is complemented by other
forms of participation, such as involvement in decision making (Jones et al., 1997;
Kruse and Blasi, 1997; Poutsma, 2001; Perotin and Robinson, 2003), thus avoiding or
reducing the free rider effect, or the inefficiency associated with group incentives (Oyer,
2004; Weitzman and Kruse, 1990; Poutsma et al., 2006).
Therefore, taking into account latest research (Sesil, 2006), which shows that a
combination of control and rights to a share in profits of the employees bring better
results for firms than if each is considered separately, it would appear that results
obtained by LOFs should beat those achieved by CF. After all, the legal framework
governing this context combines both social and economic rights.
Although the theoretical debate has not produced decisive results, the positive
effects derived from the implementation of financial participation plans have been
widely and rapidly disseminated. For this reason, we aim to find additional evidence
by exploiting the fact that the LOFs in Spain are governed by a legal structure, and to
recommend similar regulation in Europe.
3.1 Choice of economic variables
The companies in our sample are classified by whether or not they have majority
participation by employees. Given that financial participation is the dependent
variable, and that this can only give two results (the company either does or does not
have employee participation) we will work with qualitative models, also known
as discrete choice or binary. The dependent variable is coded as 0 for LOFs and
1 for CFs.
With respect to independent variables, current empirical research shows the
transcendence of profitability (return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE)),
productivity[1] and the coefficient of equity capital[2] as variables which contribute to
the differentiation of LOFs from CFs (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Poutsma et al., 2006;
Melgarejo et al., 2007).
Nevertheless, in this study, we have also chosen to include (in a second model) a
greater number of economic variables[3] in order to try to improve the precision of the
study and to allow us to make reliable inferences regarding the variables which turn
out to be significant.
IJSE
36,6
682
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Description of the database. We have drawn our data from the last available year
of financial statements (balance sheets and profit and loss accounts) which Spanish
companies have to deposit by law, and which are publicly available in the database
known as the Sistema de Ana´lisis de Balances Ibe´ricos (www.bvdep.com/en/sabi.html).
Given that it was necessary to use surveys prior to carrying out the empirical study
in order to check that the CFs were not actually de facto LOFs, the sample was
substantially reduced. At the same time, since 82.7 per cent of LOFs are SMBs, with a
size of 1 to 49 employees, we have used the criterion of size for categorisation purposes.
All told, the application of the three above-mentioned criteria (year of available data,
response to the survey, and size) has left us with a sample of 270 companies of each type.
3.2.2 Statistical results. To study whether or not there are differences in the two
types of companies, a logistic regression model has been used in an attempt to analyse
the variables which influence the probability that a company does or does not have
employee participation.
The regression model with a dependent binomial (logistic or logit model) (Hair et al.,
2006), is a model which will allow us to study whether the discrete variable, in our case
the financial participation of employees, does or does not depend on other variables.
4. Results obtained
There are two distinct methods of introducing variables, giving rise to two different
models:
(1) Introduction method (Model 1). The independent variables are introduced into
the model in a single step without checking entry criteria.
(2) Step-by-step method (Model 2). The independent variables are introduced into
and then eliminated from the model one by one.
4.1 Model 1 (introduction method)
In Model 1, the four independent variables which in previous studies have shown a
greater discriminatory capacity for the dependent variable are introduced: financial
profitability (ROE), economic profitability (ROA), productivity, and the equity capital
coefficient.
The following results were obtained. Using the x 2-statistic, the global significance
hypothesis is tested to see whether the coefficients of the model as a whole are
statistically different from 0 (Table I).
In this case, the 0.000 value of the associated p-value indicates that the null
hypothesis can be rejected. It is accepted that the coefficients of the model are
statistically different from 0.
x 2 Gl. Sig.
Step 1
Step 79.700 4 0.000
Block 79.700 4 0.000
Model 79.700 4 0.000
Table I.
Omnibus test of model
coefficients
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Table II shows different measures of the goodness-of-fit of the model. The
verisimilitude algorithm is a measure of the verisimilitude of the results obtained from
the estimated parameters. The following two measures indicate the percentage of
variance explained by the model. Cox and Snell’s R 2 is a general coefficient used to
estimate the proportion of variance of the dependent variable explained by the
independent variable; Negelkerke’s R 2 is a corrected version of Cox and Snell’s R 2
which adjusts the scale from 0 to 1, thus avoiding the fact that even in a perfect model
values of below one can occur, as is the case in Cox and Snell’s R 2. In our study, low
values for both measures is taken in Model 1.
Table III allows us to interpret the fit of the model. In total, 148 out of 268 LOFs were
classified correctly (55.2 per cent), as were 221 CFs out of 269 (82.9 per cent). In total,
68.7 per cent of businesses were correctly classified.
In the logit model, in contrast to the linear multiple regression model, the estimated
parameters cannot be interpreted directly (Le´vy Mangin and Varela Mallou, 2003),
given that the relationship between the explanatory variables and the probability of
occurrence in not linear. In practice, only the direction of the estimated parameters is
interpreted. Thus, depending on whether the parameter is positive or negative, when
the value of the explanatory variable increases the probability of the event under
scrutiny increases or decreases, respectively. In our case, the only variable which turns
out to be significant is financial profitability (ROE), which is negatively linked to the
CFs and positively linked to the LOFs. It is the only factor which helps to differentiate
the behaviour of the latter with regard to the former.
Therefore, in Table IV it can be observed with a confidence level of 95 per cent, that
only one independent variable, financial profitability (ROE), is significant. This
analysis shows that there are irrelevant variables which could be eliminated, and
therefore a model based on a step-forward method is constructed.
Step 22 log verisimilitude Cox and Snell’s R 2 Negelkerke’s R 2
1 664.739a 0.138 0.184
Note: aThe estimation ends with the fifth iteration because the estimations of the parameters have
changed by less than 0.001
Table II.
Abstract’s models
Forecast
Case origin
Observed LOF CF Percentage correct
Step 1
Case origin LOF 148 120 55.2
CF 48 221 82.2
Percentage global 68.7
Note: The cut value is 0.500
Table III.
Classification table
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4.2 Model 2 (step-by-step)
The previous analysis is completed using a step-by-step variable selection method in
order to eliminate variables which can be considered irrelevant to thus obtain a simpler
model. That is to say, due to the results of Model 1 not being as favourable as expected
(low goodness-of-fit, low probability of accuracy), we opt for a step-forward logistic
regression model using the “Wald” selection criterion, or “Wald’s methodology”.
In the step-forward selection method, we start with a model with no variables, just
the constant. The first variable to be introduced is the one with the p-value linked to the
statistic with the lowest score, as long as this value is inferior to a pre-determined
critical value. At each step, the variable can be eliminated if it meets the exit criterion.
The exit criterion is established in relation to verisimilitude or Wald’s statistic, in such
a way that if the associated p-value is higher than a predetermined critical value, the
variable is eliminated from the model. And so, one by one, the variables are introduced
or rejected depending on whether or not they meet the entry and exit requirements,
until the moment when none of the variables yet to be introduced into the model meet
the entry criteria and none of the variables in the model meet the exit criteria.
Summarizing the Wald forward method, we start from a null model and consider
those variables which are significant. The results obtained are as follows: just as
before, using the x 2 the global significance hypothesis of the model is tested. In this
case, the associated p-value shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected and the fact
that the coefficients are statistically different from 0 can be accepted (Table V).
Table VI shows the different goodness-of-fit measures of the model. The
verisimilitude logarithm should fall at each step, while R 2 should rise, given that the
measures are ordered chronologically and have been improved step-by-step.
The estimation of parameters is carried out by the method of maximum
verisimilitude.
Given that this is not a linear model for the estimation of parameters, an iterative
algorithm needs to be applied, in this case the estimation ends with seven iterations
because the estimations of the parameters change by less than 0.001.
Table VII allows us to interpret the fit of the model. Of a total of 223 LOFs, 184 have
been correctly classified, which accounts for 82.5 per cent. Equally, 175 CFs of 236, or
74.2 per cent, are correctly classified. Thus, the global fit is 78,2 per cent, and this
represents a substantial improvement on the previous model.
The procedure followed after this, as summarised in Table VIII, consist of
introducing a variable into the model when p-value of the score statistic, measuring the
amount of improvement in the model after introduction, is below 0.05. Once the
B ET Wald Gl. Sig. Exp(B)
Step 1 a
Productiv. 0.000 0.001 0.011 1 0.915 1.000
Return on assets 20.001 0.004 0.070 1 0.792 0.999
Return on equity 20.010 0.002 33.218 1 0.000 0.990
Coefficient of equity capital 0.322 0.194 2.763 1 0.096 1.380
Constant 0.479 0.117 16.610 1 0.000 1.614
Note: aVariable(s) introduced in Step 1: PRODUCTI, RETURNA, RETURNE, COEFCAPI
Table IV.
Variables in the equation
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variable has been introduced into the model, the system checks if it meet, the exit
criterion, in such a way that the variable is rejected if the verisimilitude statistic has an
associated p-value of over 0.10.
After introducing the variables into the model, the individual significance test is
carried out on the parameters, so that:
H 0: bj ¼ 0. The parameter is equal to 0.
H 1: bj – 0. The parameter is not 0.
where j ¼ 1, . . . , n; each parameter.
x 2 Gl. Sig.
Step 1
Step 59.773 1 0.000
Block 59.773 1 0.000
Model 59.773 1 0.000
Step 2
Step 67.665 1 0.000
Block 127.428 2 0.000
Model 127.428 2 0.000
Step 3
Step 13.145 1 0.000
Block 140.573 3 0.000
Model 140.573 3 0.000
Step 4
Step 13.462 1 0.000
Block 154.025 4 0.000
Model 154.025 4 0.000
Step 5
Step 6.459 1 0.011
Block 160.485 5 0.000
Model 160.485 5 0.000
Step 6
Step 3.634 1 0.031
Block 164.118 6 0.000
Model 164.118 6 0.000
Table V.
Omnibus test of model
coefficients
Steps 22 log verisimilitude Cox and Snell’s R 2 Negelkerke’s R 2
1 576.536a 0.122 0.163
2 508.881b 0.242 0.323
3 495.736a 0.264 0.352
4 482.284c 0.285 0.380
5 475.825d 0.295 0.393
6 472.191d 0.301 0.401
Notes: The estimation ends with the a4th, b5th, c6th and d7th iteration because the estimations of the
parameters have changed by less than 0.001, respectively
Table VI.
Abstract’s models
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Table VIII shows that the coefficients associated with all the variables is significant to
a degree of significance of 5 per cent. Given that the associated p-values are below 0.05
the null hypothesis that the parameters are not statistically different from 0 can be
rejected. Thus, the value of the associated odds ratio is different to 1 and it follows that
the analysed variables produce changes in the likelihood of occurrence and therefore
cannot be eliminated from the model.
The odds ratio is defined as the variation of the likelihood of occurrence of the event
(quotient between PðY ¼ 1Þ=PðY ¼ 0Þ). This value is the factor by which the
likelihood of occurrence of the event under study is multiplied when the associated
variable is increased by one in the case of numerical variables.
The value of exp(B), which provides the estimated odds ratio, with values of below
one indicates the chance of possibility 1 occurring is smaller than the occurrence of
possibility 0. In our study, a rise in treasury, yearly profits, value added and financial
profitability (ROE) increases the probability that the company has majority employee
participation.
On the other hand, if the ratio is greater than one, Option 1 is more likely than
Option 0. In our case, a rise in equity capital and operating revenue reduces the
probability that the company has majority employee participation.
Forecast
Case origin
Observed LOF CF Percentage correct
Step 1
Case origin LOF 223 0 100.0
CF 188 48 20.3
Percentage global 59.0
Step 2
Case origin LOF 173 50 77.6
CF 61 175 74.2
Percentage global 75.8
Step 3
Case origin LOF 177 46 79.4
CF 60 176 74.6
Percentage global 76.9
Step 4
Case origin LOF 173 50 77.6
CF 61 175 74.2
Percentage global 75.8
Step 5
Case origin LOF 177 46 79.4
CF 59 177 75.0
Percentage global 77.1
Step 6
Case origin LOF 184 39 82.5
CF 61 175 78.2
Percentage global 78.2
Note: The cut value is 0.500
Table VII.
Classification table
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In summary, this model achieves an accuracy rating of 78.2 per cent and has a moderate
fit of 0.4 for Nagelkerke’s R 2. The results presented above allow us to infer that they are
the result of the different business management policies in both types of companies.
One of the distinguishing features of the business and financial behaviour of LOFs
compared to CFs is a greater preference for liquidity. In line with Martı´n Lo´pez’s (2007,
p. 540) findings, this may be due to a preference for a more conservative sales policy,
with cash payment or short-term credit with the aim of minimizing the chances of bad
debt. Furthermore, greater available resources give them the opportunity to generate
more cash with which to meet short-term commitments to third parties.
The yearly profit and added value variables have also helped to differentiate LOFs
from CFs, while the operating revenue variable is more favourable for CFs, which could
be due to the greater cost-control capacity attributable to LOFs in line with Melgarejo
et al.’s (2007) findings.
Finally, we can link the equity capital variable, which is favourable for CFs, to the
annual profit and financial profitability (ROE) variables, which are favourable for LOFs,
because it is possible to infer from these results that LOFs manage to obtain better
results for their partners from their own resources through better business performance.
B ET Wald Gl. Sig. Exp(B)
Step 1
ROE 2 0.008 0.001 32.058 1 0.000 0.992
Step 2
Operat. revenue 0.001 0.000 39.387 1 0.000 0.987
ROE 20.013 0.002 44.195 1 0.000 0.987
Step 3
Equity capital 0.001 0.001 4.356 1 0.037 1.001
Operat. revenue 0.001 0.000 19.836 1 0.000 1.001
ROE 2 0.012 0.002 40.043 1 0.000 0.988
Step 4
Equity capital 0.004 0.001 10.506 1 0.001 1.004
Operat. revenue 0.001 0.000 13.326 1 0.000 1.001
Y. profit 20.007 0.002 11.594 1 0.001 0.993
ROE 20.012 0.002 39.352 1 0.000 0.998
Step 5
Treasury 2 0.004 0.002 5.553 1 0.018 0.996
Equity capital 0.005 0.001 14.294 1 0.000 1.005
Operat. revenue 0.001 0.000 16.777 1 0.000 1.001
Y. profit 2 0.008 0.002 14.117 1 0.000 0.992
ROE 2 0.012 0.002 38.173 1 0.000 0.988
Step 6
Treasury 20.004 0.002 5.737 1 0.017 0.996
Equity capital 0.006 0.001 15.504 1 0.000 1.006
Operat. revenue 0.001 0.000 17.186 1 0.000 1.001
Y. profit 20.007 0.002 8.208 1 0.004 0.993
Value added 20.002 0.001 3.443 1 0.005 0.998
ROE 20.011 0.002 34.912 1 0.000 0.989
Notes: Variable(s) introduced in Step 1: ROE; Step 2: OPERATREV; Step 3: ECAPITAL; Step 4:
YPROFIT; Step 5: TREASURY; Step 6: VADDED
Table VIII.
Variables in the equation
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5. Conclusions
The initial aim of this study was to propose regulation through a specific European law
governing “investment capital of employees” which any business organisation could
turn to and which could improve the possibilities of employee participation, backed up
by results of the present study.
This is not a new idea and has been included in the report on the Commission
communication to the Council, the Parliament, the Social and Economic Committee and
the Regional Committee about a framework for the financial participation of employees
(European Commission, 2002), but what is new here is the proposal to regulate a
European LOF, taking the Spanish LOF as a reference model for businesses with
majority employee participation.
However, the results produced by the statistical data are not as good as could have
been hoped in order to support this proposal. In this study, we can conclude from the
hypotheses raised, which have been tested in other studies referred to in the theoretical
framework, that the Model 1 results indicate that business profitability (ROA),
productivity and equity capital coefficient are not significant variables for the purpose
of determining the distinguishing features of LOFs as against CFs. The only variable
of those originally included which has turned out to be significant is that of financial
profitability (ROE).
Having said this, however, of the significant variables which contribute to the
differentiation of both types of firm, Model 2 allows us to distinguish a preference for
liquidity and better business performance as measured by annual profits, added value,
cost control and greater profitability on equity capital.
Notes
1. Productivity (last year) ¼ (Revenues 2 Consumption of goods and raw materials 2 Other
business costs)/Wages.
2. CCP ¼ Equity capital/Total liabilities.
3. Tangible and intangible assets, current assets, treasury, total assets, equity capital, total
liabilities, working capital, net income, gross result, ordinary result before taxes, result of the
exercise (yearly profit), personnel expenses (wages), cash flow, value added, earnings before
interest and taxes, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization,
indebtedness, capacity of return, general liquidity, immediate liquidity, solvency ratio,
profit for employee, average cost of employee, equity capital for employee, and total assets
for employee.
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